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Every mathematician knows that a rigorous proof is only one aspect of actually doing 
mathematics and is often temporally the last thing you need to do mathematics. The logic of 
Aristotle and its modern successors is surely a way of organizing this artifact called a proof, 
although the order and rhetoric of actual proofs are very far from the metamathematician’s 
dream. And, it should be noted, a proof is just one way, an often clumsy one to be sure, of 
convincing other mathematicians. But in doing mathematics, the mathematician at one point 
or another, well before the rigorous proof is attempted, can say “I know it’s true” with a con- 
fidence that is at least as well founded as a claim about the color of the sky. The logic of the 
mathematician’s actual practice is based on seeing lhrough to what is actually going on in the 
world and showing others how to see. 
Such a logic of actual practice surely depends on the education of the mathematician, as 
well as his natural expectations, what he sees clearly and manifestly, and what he discerns just 
at and over the horizon. The objects the mathematician deals with. whether they be groups or 
topological spaces, have an autonomy of their own, and in their productivity and fruitfulness 
strike the mathematician as fertile. The mathematicians’s problem is to set up that world of 
objects so that what is true is seen clearly as true: a world in which the deeper truths about 
itself are evident, or they are empirically discoverable by exploring appropriate concrete exam- 
ples and cases. The great achievement of the mathematician is to set up not only those worlds 
but also moments of “revelation,” whether they be particular examples or even in elegant 
proofs, when what might or might not be the case is seen to be obviously and necessarily the 
case. Put differently, the problem is to create a potent and fruitful world which then has a life 
of its own, and in our watching it we discover what is true about our world. And in so seeing, 
mathematics is not only true and ready to be rigorously proven but is applied and applicable 
and useful. 
This is a rather strong set of claims, and in what follows I shall articulate them in some 
detail. What is crucial is to keep in mind that the work of the mathematician has many 
analogies with that of creators of other worlds, such as novelists and musicians. And the 
process of seeing the truth in mathematics is rather much like the process of seeing the truth 
about many of the manifest features of everyday life. 
Being Educated 
If you are educated you have appropriate expectations, intuitions, and inklings about the 
world. When you say, “It must be true,” you are usually right; and you can give good reasons 
why, perhaps based on experience and what are taken as archetypal examples. Of course your 
intuitions could fail you. But other educated persons will appreciate why you might have 
believed that your insight was valid. Your failure is indicative not of carelessness or idiosyn- 
cratic commitments but of more general mistakes shared by others. When you say “this MUSI 
be true” about the mathematical world, and “the proof must goes as follows,” your claim is 
based on many successful past experiences where you have been right about what is true. And 
you have figured out just how to go about convincing others who are not so sure or insightful 
about what you claim. 
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Just because you see something does not mean you see it clearly or whole. So you may have 
an algebra but not appreciate its meaning. You have seen a few aspects of the algebra realized 
in some models, but you do not have a good idea of what a full model would look like. You 
might even be able to use the algebra to organize lots of particular observations but still not 
be sure what it is you have gotten hold of. You might say you have “a notation, but no pic- 
ture.” Or you have seen two sides of what must be a many-sided object and have no idea what 
it looks like. You know something more is there; you are sure of it. The horizon is open and 
beckoning. And on that horizon there are many possible pictures (that is what it means to 
have a horizon), pictures we have encountered in our explorations. So you can find a picture 
that fits, especially if you know how to piece together and otherwise alter pictures you already 
know well. Having found a picture that seems to fit. you have an idea of what that something 
looks like. 
When you are sure what it is you have a hold on, you believe you see why the various 
aspects appeared to you as they once did, and you appreciate why they now hold together 
and belong together. You literally see what is true, just as you do ordinarily every day. (I am 
not arguing whether or not this is a warranted way of discovering mathematical truth, or 
whether truth is visual, but rather that this is what mathematicians actually do.) 
Surely your inklings may be quite inchoate or schematic. So you may not really understand 
just what is going on in an asymptotic approximation, but you have a feeling that it has 
something to do with the difference between kinds of limits as sketched in another context. 
You may tell yourself the answer is of “this sort,” but what does that mean? There are many 
different kinds of “sorts.” But at least, and this is most crucial, you have someplace from 
which to start, someplace to go, and a place from which to work. 
That particular set of someplaces is what makes you a mathematician. Everyone has 
inklings and intuitions, and everyone discovers more about the world in roughly the same 
way. But you have a particular set of models, pictures. and cases, successful past practices and 
techniques-a toolkit, a craft, a culture-that provides you with a mathematical world 
(perhaps delimited by your own specialty), and a way of getting along in it. (What might be 
such a toolkit and craft for topology?) 
More generally, mathematicians share a variety of tools and tactics. For example, an 
experienced mathematician knows that if one goes to a “co”-space, something might be clearer 
or easier to prove. Typically, one has a repertoire of transformation rules and test examples. 
which one casually invokes not needing to be sure they will apply, make perfect sense, or will 
work. But they have before, and they just might now. 
If you are stuck, if your intuitions and inklings fail you, if you do not know where to go 
next, you try one of these transformations and tricks and see if it helps. Of course, with more 
experience you have a better feel for which ones are likely to be fruitful. And you are as well 
likely to be biased against others, so that if they are the right ones this time you will miss 
them-and someone perhaps of a younger generation will make a “discovery.” 
Education allows you to have some interesting ideas and intuitions, and it introduces you 
to the problems everyone takes as interesting. You have perhaps mastered the tools and are a 
craftsperson. Even when you are stuck you have an idea of what to try next. But what is 
remarkable, what every mathematician feels and knows, is that the mathematical world has its 
own autonomy and fertility. If it is an invented world. it seems to come alive and have its own 
way with us. 
The Mathematical World: Autonom)) and Fertility 
To a practicing mathematician the world of mathematical objects is surely something given 
form by the mathematician. But that world then presents itself as a defiant challenge: having 
its own will, its own structure, its own truths, almost despite what we do. It has a life of its 
own, and if we are to be good mathematicians we need to acknowledge that and pay attention 
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to just how the world resists our initial intuitions, inventions, and discoveries. Just because a 
particular space is supposed to have certain properties does not mean it will possess them. 
And just what it does not possess will tell us a great deal about how we have to revise our 
intuitions, and so the construction of that mathematical object. 
If we treat mathematical objects as real and independent of us. we then seem to have the 
right attitude for attacking mathematical problems and mysteries. And of course we want to 
have a feel for these objects and, in that sense, be in sympathy or at home with them. (See 
E. F. Keller, A Feeling ji)r /he Organism.) But it is a feel for something that has its own being 
and will, something that will resist us as it will. Realism is not so much a philosophical or 
metaphysical commitment as a practical one. 
Another attestation to the autonomy of the mathematical world is that it resists our generic 
practices. Say we know how to do a series expansion following a general rule, such as in a 
Taylor expansion. We might come to believe that such general rules produce series that con- 
verge in some nice way. We then, in what we have come to call divergent (or asymptotic) 
series, apply another genera1 but still seemingly innocuous rule to produce a series. But in fact 
that series blows up after a certain number of terms. Our disappointment and the world’s 
resistance lie not only in that divergence, but also in the failure of that nice general rule to 
work all the way down the line. Here the generic practice fails as a generic practice, even if it 
does produce very line approximations. 
Once we have a notation that works or a formalism that is effective, there is a regime in 
which that notation and formalism is manifestly true. So we can actually see (a picture of) 
how the world works, We take that existence of a realized model as a sign of the reality of 
mathematical objects. Our formal confections, if they are true. are actually realized in nature. 
If the mathematical world is autonomous, it is as well fertile-fruitful. playful, involving, 
and possessing its own modes of unity and composition. 
A mathematician is often surprised by the fruitfulness and unity of the mathematical world. 
One designs objects and spaces and worlds and then discovers that they are just like 
predecessor objects. Or perhaps objects can be readily transformed into each other by curious 
formal transformations such as converting indices into exponents. Now in part this unity 
might be attributed to a mathematician’s patterned modes of working, so that design, inven- 
tion, and discovery are within well-worn paths and forms. So naturally they just work out to 
be the same. But often those similarities are not at all straightforward, and they require sub- 
stantial apparatus and justification in order to make sense of the similarity. Usually it is even- 
tually possible to show that the forma1 unity is in fact obvious and necessary. And in fact 
without it being so possible, it is not likely that the substantial apparatus and justification will 
be believed with conviction, But it was not so obvious at first. 
Mathematical objects also seem to be fruitful of themselves. They do things we would not 
have expected and surely they were not set up to do or are applicable in surprising places. 
A structure created for one motive. say in algebra, becomes productive in what seems like 
an entirely different context, such as computer science. Unexplained fruitfulness is usually 
disturbing. So at this point one shows how disparate areas are actually “the same,” or surpris- 
ing capacities are simply a matter of our not having appreciated how much potency we have 
already put into our objects. Our anxieties become domesticated: aspectual variations and 
surprises are attached to a well-defined object, an object that does everything you could 
possibly imagine and more. Fertility becomes mundane manufacture. 
Still, what remains is the fact of mathematical life-the world is more unified than we 
expect, and objects of that world seem to have a potency of their own. 
To boot, the mathematical objects are often pictures, symbols, or icons that grab us and 
lead us to new insights. If we write derivatives as quotients (dr/&), following Leibniz’ 
deliberate intention and guidance, and then treat such quotients as ordinary fractions, all sorts 
of nice rules are immediately suggested-and often they are true. If we play around with such 
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(notational) objects, if we become familiar with them by looking closely at specitic examples 
and cases, and if we are willing to pay attention to their particularity and idiosyncracy, they 
give us back new insights. Playing is productive. Now for those who know how to play, 
improvisory moves are ones that have often worked in the past. Trial-and-error works 
because in actuality it is not random but patterned. Mathematicians are like most people: they 
believe that the form of the truth will be much like predecessor forms, and when one comes 
close to having such a form one is encouraged. 
Once we are grabbed by an icon, by a suggestive formal inkling or intuition, it may still 
leave us unsatisfied and wondering just what there is about it we find desirable. Working for 
years with a problem, we build up a catalog of special cases, partially understood parts, and 
false starts. We arc hungry for new leads and are on the lookout for, and so recognize, 
promising ones when they come along. They often seem to fit terrain we have already worked 
over in many ways and from many angles. 
Along the way we work out lots of particular examples. And so we may find a rich and 
capacious example or model that seems to embody everything that is true about this part of 
the world. We work on this example hoping that the more general truth will emerge from it. 
So we find the most general features of a mathematical object or of a space (or of the 
mathematical world), by finding out empirically about a particular case or set of cases. And 
our claim then becomes what might be called hopeful induction: It is true in this most 
representative case or cases which seem to represent all the possibilities, and so “it must be 
true” and “it must go this way.” 
The mathematical world is not only fruitful and playful. It also bears close paying attention 
to its details and specifics. The mathematician is excited by parts and pieces that are taken as 
significant of the whole-technically, what might be called fetishism. A peculiar feature charms 
us, not as an irritation but as a mystery that should lead us to further interest in this situation. 
For although mathematicians aim for generality and universality, understanding just how that 
is possible may well require being involved with a particular case, a peculiar problem, an 
exception to what one has taken as the rule. 
Empirical Proving and Discovery 
It is worth emphasizing how empirical and instantial mathematical work is. You try out 
what you think might be true on your favorite set of test cases, and if it is true for them it is 
almost surely true more generally. The set of test cases are developed over the years. Some are 
part of the standard toolkit of a mathematician in a subfield; others are idiosyncratic and even 
private (and perhaps shared with students). These test cases cannot be publicly claimed to be 
tiducial, for they will surely fail sometime. But for the moment they are rather powerful guides 
and tests. 
The tests are perhaps of two sorts, stochastic and exhaustive: This set of cases is a good 
sample of the universe of model situations, and if it works for them it is likely to work for all. 
Or, this set of cases just about exhausts the various possible situations, and it it works for 
them it will work for all others since they are just like one of these. 
The physicist Richard Feynman puts it: 
“Good. Give me one example.” That was for me: I can’t understand anything 
in general unless I’m carrying along in my mind a specific example and 
watching it go. Some people think in the beginning that I’m kind of slow and I 
don’t understand the problem, because I ask a lot of these “dumb” questions: Is 
a cathode plus or minus? Is an ion this way, or that way? 
But later, when the guy’s in the middle of a bunch of equations, he’ll say 
something and I’ll say, “Wait a minute! There’s an error! That can’t be right!” 
330 BOOK REVIEW 
The guy looks at his equations, and sure enough after a while. he finds the 
mistake and wonders, “How the hell did this guy, who hardly understood at the 
beginning, find that mistake in the mess of all these equations?” 
He thinks I’m following the steps mathematically, but that’s not what I’m 
doing. I have the specific, physical example of what he’s trying to analyze, and I 
know from instinct and experience the properties of the thing. So when the 
equation says it should behave so-and-so. and I know that’s the wrong way 
around, I jump up and say, “Wait! There’s a mistake!” (.Sure~~ You’re Joking 
Mr. Fqxman. p. 224). 
As I have indicated earlier if you have a good model example, so that a part of the 
mathematical world is faithfully instantiated (or at least you believe it is so instantiated), then 
you can infer general consequences by properly reading them off the model. The general con- 
sequences are manifest. In this sense a good notation is perspicuous, in that what is true is 
true merely by the form of the notation and the natural set of operations that go along with it. 
What is true is manifestly true. 
Of course, what still needs explaining is how one learns to properly “read off,” and to make 
the “natural” set of notational moves. In being educated one is taught to read and make 
moves, modes of reading and moving which have worked in the past, and which might even 
have been justified within mathematics. The modes of reading and moving may even embody 
deeper truths (for example, ones that have been metamathematically or more generally 
proven) about the mathematical world. 
If you have some model examples and a notation through which you can read off what 
must be the case, you begin to see through to what is really going on, you begin to really 
understand. But this is only a beginning, for what is needed is a greater variety of examples 
and a more general vision. Proofs back up your insight, and assure you that you have seen it 
all. (Technically. after revelation comes doctrine and theology.) 
Recelation 
Mathematics as it is actually practiced depends on setting up moments when what is true is 
manifest and obvious. so that rationality, rigor. and orderly proof are justified. Just because 
you can prove it does not make it believable. For a proof as such need not give you a feel for 
the world: namely. why the world which could have been otherwise turns out this way. 
You need to set up an historical moment. such as a lecture, when what is true is displayed 
and is manifestly believable, no matter how remarkable it is. The community of 
mathematicians will have to be made ready, be prepared to appreciate that the world turns 
out to be this way. The alternatives that do not work need to have a richness that allows the 
true case to stand out as true and for good reasons. 
All of this is no mean achievement. I use the word “historical” above because what is 
needed is sequence of moves and setups, so that proving is educating and rhetorically effective; 
so that the stage is set up for seeing. Early on in the development of a Iield, there will be a 
period when there is much wallowing. Then there may be perspicuous examples, some of 
which show what must be the case and others which are not quite right, but not quite right in 
interesting, tantalizing, and problematic ways. They will eventually need explaining. Then 
perhaps a halting, inelegant, but valid proof is found. one that makes you believe even more 
strongly in your model examples but does not quite tell you what is really going on. In time, 
new concepts and definitions are created. new notations are imported and invented, and you 
can say what is true in a more compact fashion. Perhaps a new model which embodies the 
truths of the definitions and notation can be confected. Then a proof comes along in which 
what was a formal curiosity follows naturally and obviously, maybe even in one line. Along 
the way, “this is true” or “this is it” is no longer a matter of logic or example, but becomes a 
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manifest part of reality, eventually to be freed from its rhetorical and historical invention, to 
be seen as just there, as just a fact and an object of nature. 
Of course things do not always work out. An insight does not always pan out, even with 
fixes and reformulations. Now it just might be that it fails for a profound reason. Experienced 
practitioners have developed a good feel for when to pursue a lead and when they are misled, 
how far out to go on a limb and what kind of extra support it might be worth having along. 
And if the limb breaks, really ingenious workers figure out how to make something interesting 
of a fallen branch. 
Seeing It as It Is 
I have been pressing the notion of sight to describe what a mathematician knows and what 
is in his or her horizon. Early on you do the best you can. But eventually you can understand 
what is going on and so generate deep insights and even proofs, if you have the right models 
and pictures of the world-so you just read off what is true about it. And mathematics has 
applications by showing how the world is to be seen in terms of the tools and pictures the 
mathematician can employ. So within the horizon of pure mathematics lie its applications and 
its models. These are applications and models which are already present (but not always seen 
as applications or models) when one begins to read off what is true about the world. We 
might say that because mathematics shares in the general culture, therein lie the connections 
with the problems that mathematics will eventually confront, find speakable in its language, 
and so be applied. In this sense, theory invents practical needs in order to justify itself. 
Let me summarize: We design a mathematical world which then seems vastly more potent 
than we could have imagined ahead of time. That is because we allow ourselves to forget that 
that design is not a matter of pushing together a tinkertoy set of alienated objects. We work 
with objects we have already encountered, here mathematical objects quite laden with prac- 
tical experience, quite a part of the world, quite alive and meaningful. That is why we can 
work with them in the first place. They participate in our fantasies and stories immediately, at 
first hand. The trick in doing mathematics is to learn how to acknowledge their life and 
richness, figuring out what questions to ask of them that they can answer for us. 
The Ethnomethodology of Mathematics 
What I have been saying may well be an accurate description of mathematicians’ work. But 
it does not provide exact details of what the mathematician does, and might even be called 
handwaving. Just how are things natural or clear or fruitful? Most of the literature on the 
philosophy of mathematics (e.g., as in Benacerraf and Putnam’s collection) is not intended to 
ask this question. Lakatos (in Proofs and Refutations) has some suggestions. What is needed is 
a close study of what mathematicians do. And that is exactly what Eric Livingston has tried to 
do in the book under review-in this case, the formal presentation of mathematical work in 
lectures or at the blackboard or in papers. He is interested in “rediscovering and exhibiting the 
naturally accountable mathematical proof, in its identifying detail for mathematicians, as a 
social achievement.” 
The Ethnomethodological Foundations of Mathematics will seem curious to outsiders. It 
comes out of a particular sect in sociological research, strongly influenced by the 
phenomenological philosopher Edmund Husserl (1869-1939). My extended discussion so far 
is meant to set the stage for saying just what this book does. Namely, it shows in detail the 
moves the mathematician makes “at the blackboard” which allow the mathematician to con- 
vince others of the truth and meaning of his findings. Choices of notation, order of proof, use 
of example are crucial. The rhetoric is quite specific and professionally prescribed. Livingston, 
in a unique study has described some of what a mathematician does. He shows how 
notational form and even the symbols one uses are in a sense necessary, if the work of proving 
is to be perspicuously understood. 
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Livingston is concerned with God&s theorem and its proof, choosing this rather difficult 
example in part because of its popular significance. How does its apparatus (Godel num- 
bering, double diagonalization) work, in the sense of convincing one of the meaning and truth 
of Godel’s theorem. How is the ordering of the proved sub-theorems a mode of education and 
exposition, and not only a logical sequence? 
Such a complex example will at least suggest to mathematicians that this book is somehow 
about what they do. Most writing about mathematics by philosophers and sociologists and 
historians uses toy examples that no mathematician would lind relevant. It may be shocking 
to mathematicians that a whole book is needed to make the point that mathematicians make 
moves at the blackboard that are meant to convince other mathematicians (that is what it 
means to be doing proofs). Proving is a mode of making the truth apparent-both in the 
objects the proof employs, and in how it goes about employing those objects (the method 
itself often being of interest). But given the general culture of writing about mathematics by 
scholars in other fields, such a book is essential. 
My purpose here is twofold. First, the book requires technical sophistication in 
mathematics and in sociology. and so the number of readers may well be small. 
Ethnomethodology is a sociological sub-field which takes the methods by which we do things 
as ethnographic data to be used to understand society; here how a proof is actually done helps 
to understand what mathematicians do together. Perhaps this review, and Livingston’s first 
and last chapters, can set the stage for increasing the number of readers. 
Second, Livingston closes his book by suggesting that the next step lies in describing how 
mathematicians build structures. I have tried to set forth what everyone knows about this and 
what such a description would have to account for. 
None of these features of the actual doing of mathematics should be surprising to the work- 
ing mathematician. If you are educated and develop appropriate horizons and expectations, if 
you respect the autonomy and fertility of mathematical objects. if you are willing to play 
around with such an empirical world in order to find out more about its most pervasive 
properties, and if you are willing to work at setting up a display of what you have come to 
understand so that others can see it as clearly as you do-then you are a mathematician. It is 
Livingston’s achievement to show in detail how some of this takes place. 
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